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1. Introduction 
This article concerns itself with the question of textualization in legal discourse. More 
specifically, it examines the ongoing treatment of some previously textualized evidentiary 
discourse by various legal figures. There has been a widespread and ongoing concern among 
many scholars who suggest that legal professionals intrinsically possess and regularly exercise 
interactional control over facts, sometimes to the detriment of adequate and effective service 
(O’Gorman 1963; Rosenthal 1974; Hosticka 1979; Cain 1983; Bogoch 1994).  Controlling the 
production of facts can manifest itself in a variety of ways, one of them being the activity of 
creating ‘records,’ i.e., transforming spoken discourse that belongs to a non professional, i.e., 
the client, and, by default, the realm of the ordinary and mundane in accordance with the 
institutional rules of documentation (Garfinkel 1967; Benson and Drew 1978; Atkinson and 
Drew 1979; Raffel 1979; Travers 1997; Lynch 1999, 2002). For the legal research, the 
common problem with textualized appearances lies in ‘the reduction of facts to law’ (Stygall 
1994: 88). 
It has been further argued that the significance of record-making lies in their archival 
properties (Derrida 1996; Agamben 2002). Created in the course of the talk-to-text 
transformation, legal documents can be easily taken for containers of ‘facts’ or ‘evidence.’  
Empirical studies that focus on the activities of documentation confirm philosophical 
suspicions in attributing to record-making the capacity to shape, reshape, and thus alter oral 
discourse by way of literalizing its ‘core’ for specific purposes of the legal establishment  
(Lemert 1969; Raffel 1979; Goodrich 1984; Goody 1986, Jönsson and Linell 1991; Lynch 
and Bogen 1996; Linell, 1998). Upon a closer scrutiny of these and other sources, it becomes 
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clear that the apparent problem with documenting activity of law is informed by two co-
dependent assumptions: a) transfer from one communication medium to another, from one 
speaker to another, from one discourse to another, and from one situational task to another, 
implying b) the finite separation of the original discourse from its ‘record.’ In other words, it 
is assumed that, in its documented form, i.e., a written statement or a deposition, the 
defendant’s narrative, is going to differ radically from its point of origin, an oral recital of 
facts. Moreover, in order for a fact of life to become a ‘legal fact,’ it must be pre-separated 
from the point of its origin. Secondly and co-extensively, for the ‘record’ to count as a fact, it 
must be fixed in the legal discourse as if it were an original.  
It is to the second assumption that I would like to address this essay. At issue is the 
proposition that once in-text, discourse creates a singularity of meaning, which, from that 
moment on, allows legal professionals to refer to it as ‘the same matter.’ Since the process of 
documenting not only factualizes but objectifies discourse, I would like to approach 
documented facts, commonly known as evidence, as ‘objects of discourse’ or ‘discursive 
objects.’ Short of challenging the idea of fixeity per se, I would like to question the 
association between the documented statement and its identity. My hope is that this 
association, once disclosed, would give us the clue to the structure of the legal fact, or 
evidence; hence, the question for this examination, How if factual identity is constituted in 
legal records? The question receives diverse elaborations in recent critical examinations of 
discourse formation, which show that an object of discourse does not stop generating meaning 
once it undergoes a change in accordance with the rules of a specific medium and setting but 
continues to do so from within that medium by creating a space of signification of its own 
(Deleuze 1968; Foucault 1972; Latour 1996). For example, Gilles Deleuze proposes that in 
discourse, an object functions as a virtual object, and, as such, it is always necessarily partial. 
One part remains fixed in a particular discourse while the other is open to further 
signification. This structure is unsettled as it creates a conflict between the place of fixation 
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and the space of signification. Forgetfulness of this conflict brings about an impression of 
reality (1968: 100-103; author’s italics). In legal discourse, documented texts are places of 
fixation par excellence. Not only they archive ‘facts’ following prescribed legal formats in a 
manner of Foucault’s panopticum, their key purpose is to make these facts ‘come alive,’ that 
is perform themselves whether in front of the jury or the judge (Matoesian 2001: 105).  
From this perspective, we can understand an object of discourse not simply as the 
same matter, a legal fact, but as a matter-in-becoming, which continues its dynamism from 
within the place of fixation. In turn, on the basis of this conceptualization we can conceive of 
the matter-in-becoming as an object of discourse that is able of transcending its original form 
and thereby ‘appearing’ in talk or in text, respectively. Matoesian calls this capacity for the 
evidential source to enter and leave different media through the intertextual connection 
‘production media’ (2000: 880). Although helpful in showing how intertextuality generates 
inconsistency, the notion of ‘production media’ concerns itself with the ambiguous side of the 
fixed object. With this concern it complements the research on the ‘career’ of a legal 
statement, which is primarily interested in the definitive side of the transformational process. 
By focusing on the two polar outcomes, ambiguity and definiteness in a manner of separation, 
neither approach is able of clarifying the possibility that both outcomes can be effected 
simultaneously. I therefore suggest that, in this article, we investigate the processes and 
conditions that allow for an object to be both fixed, and, at the same time, retain its 
identifying features. With this dual focus, we should reformulate the previously posed 
question in the following manner, How can a documented fact be and become, at the same 
time? 
For the process that maintains identity in difference I would like to take the concept of 
cohesion. Cohesion can be defined as a set of resources for constructing relations in discourse 
which transcend grammatical structure (Halliday 1994: 309). Thus defined, cohesion helps us 
trace the identity an object in the process of its becoming, i.e., as it takes place in a specific 
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space of signification. Importantly, the space of signification is not a thing, nor is it a sum of 
manifest entities. It is rather a set of conditions that allow for carrying out meaningful 
attributions. Those are always discourse and task specific. Their specificity is influenced by a 
particular setting; in turn, the setting shows itself in the means of its unfolding. For an object-
in-becoming to continue, it must invariably engage three co-extensive levels: grammatical, 
semantic, and pragmatic. The relationship between the three levels is not a presumed one but 
manifests itself in certain discourse markers, such as the article, conjunction, pronouns, 
syntactic position, and synonymy, among others (Schiffrin 1987). Those and other means 
‘signal’ the degree of sameness and difference, which is sufficiently subtle to create 
ambiguity and, at the same time, sufficiently definite to allow an interlocutor to understand 
the sameness of the object under discussion (Kartunnen 1968; Chafe 1976; Hawkins 1978; Du 
Bois 1980). The constitutive features of cohesion point again to the bi-polar structure of the 
discursive object: ambiguity resides on the other side of definiteness (He 2001; Gotti 2005). 
This is to say that ambiguity differs from non-definiteness because it comes about as a 
resource and not as a lack of definiteness (Schegloff 1984). Therefore, the relationship 
between definiteness and ambiguity is not that of subordination but that of co-determination. 
One can put it in this way: while definiteness comes about as a result of engaging certain 
explicating means, ambiguity provides for further explication.1
In the following section I investigate how a text-dependent legal object coheres while 
undergoing transformations in different media and in different voices (Ravotas and 
Berkenkotter 1998).  The investigation is limited to several an oral excerpt and several 
documents from a specific case, the data for which was collected during extensive 
ethnographic fieldwork in a private law firm ‘Dorman, Tucker and Tucker’ located in a small 
town in one of the Great Plains States during two consecutive summers, in 2003 and 2004. 2 
The firm consisted of three partners: Jack Dorman, my principal informant, and Tom and 
Frank Tucker, the firm’s original founders.  Jack was the attorney whom I shadowed for the 
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duration of my fieldwork.  The firm’s emphasis was family law: divorce and child custody 
cases comprised over seventy percent of the practice’s earnings.  Insurance and worker’s 
compensation presented another lucrative category.  In contrast to the civil caseload, criminal 
cases in the firm appeared on occasion and, in Jack’s own words, were there ‘to fill the gap.’ 
Among those fillers, there were many misdemeanour cases, such as DUI (driving under the 
influence), Simple Assault, and Small Theft, with an occasional felony, such as Grand Theft, 
Aggravated Assault, Rape, and Manslaughter. The original focus of my research was criminal 
casework; more specifically, I was interested in the relationship between the pre-trail practices 
and activities that counted as preparatory for the criminal case and the ways they helped 
present the case at the trial stage. It was this interest that prompted Jack to invite me to the 
local jail for ‘a talk with the biggest criminal on the Federal plate.’  
The case in question had been under investigation for two years. Jack’s client was 
charged with ‘conspiracy, use of a communication facility in causing or facilitating the 
commission of a felony under the controlled substance act,’ and a number of minor 
violations.3 This is to say that he ran a small drug gang of low paid mules and distributors. 
Incarcerated at the time of my visit, Dane, the defendant, was facing the sentencing. About a 
month before the visit, in the face of the overwhelming evidence from the US Attorney, Dane 
agreed to a plea-bargain. The terms and the conditions of the plea-bargain agreement required 
that he disclosed the names and criminal actions of his accomplices, in other words, became a 
witness for the prosecution. In exchange for his cooperation, the Federal Government 
promised that his sentencing would be cut in half. The number of years to be reduced 
depended on the calculations made by the Probation Officer for the Federal Judge in 
accordance with the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in the Presentence Report. The purpose of 
the meeting with Dane in jail was to discuss the Report. The Report had been sent to Dane in 
advance together with the Jack’s letter, which explained some of the technicalities, including 
those concerning the upcoming sentencing. On the designated day Jack and I walked over to 
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the county jail. The meeting took place in the jail’s ‘library.’ The discussion lasted 
approximately forty minutes. I recorded parts of the interaction. In addition, I took extensive 
notes. The excerpt below is a transcript based on both sources of data. It begins several 
minutes into the conversation. The ethnographic bias for this examination prompts me to use 
the conference for an entry point into the discussion. Documented excerpts from the case file 
constitute additional sources of data for the subsequent analysis. The use of a single case 
points to the indicative rather than definitive spirit of this study. The transcription below is 
designed in the manner of the theatrical script, as a dialogue, where the speakers’ names 
precede the utterances, while their dispositions and other context relevant information are 
given in square brackets.  
2.  ‘A Bunch of Good for Nothing Rifles’ 
Excerpt (AT-P3-6704/40):4 
Jack:  ‘So, as you can see, rule 35 will put you in the 27-32 month bracket. I know. I 
know, but that was the plea-bargain agreement [a few minutes later]. So, you are 
getting 27 to 32 years.’ 
Dane [looking shocked, to Jack]: ‘What was did you just say? 27 to 32 years. You must be 
joking. Is it a joke? I hope not. Do you even know who I am? I am a nark.5 Do 
you even understand what it means for a fucking nark to be in a maximum-
security prison for 20 years. I will croak in the fucking prison. I will be in the 
same outfit as murderers and rapists and sadists. I will have to fight for my life 
every single day. My ass is grass, pal!’  
Jack [somewhat sympathetic]: ‘I understand that it is a disability; it will put you in a situation. 
But you will be able to deal with it. Besides, as I told you, you will not get that 
sentence. You cooperated, so they will cut it in half. You will be out sooner than 
you think.’ 
[ten minutes later] 
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Dane:  ‘But you told me that I would get five to seven years.’  
Jack:  ‘It appeared that way first but that’s what happened.  Look’ [pointing to a 
document in the file] ‘They added a couple of levels: you were on an 
unsupervised probation for some DUI misdemeanour and that upped your 
sentence by two levels.’ 
Dane: ‘So, I am getting four years of hard labor for a fucking misdemeanour!’  
Jack [in overlap, ignoring Dane’s interruption]: ‘Then. Here. See? You had possession of  
→ (1) illegal weapons.’  
Dane [interrupting]:  
→ (2)  ‘But they were fucking BB guns. A .22 and a .35! I took them with me to shoot 
some damn prairie dogs. They were there in the trunk, and I told the cops when 
they pulled me over in Leams that they were right there in the fucking trunk. I 
didn’t hide nothing.’  
[five minute pause, Jack leafing through the file] 
Jack:  ‘Okay, that’s good, and that’s what we need to talk about today.  I will file an 
objection, and we are going to say that you had them rifles to shoot prairie dogs, 
→ (3)  right? And that it wasn’t like a GUN gun but a bunch of good for nothing rifles.’  
Dane [interjecting]:  
→ (4)  ‘And they never found a handgun on me. They pulled me over, and they 
searched the car, and they found nothing. They took me to the station and they 
found zip in my house later.’ 
Jack [taking notes]: ‘Okay. Then, we are going to say that you showed good on these 
accusations and they need to ease off your back a little.’  
Dane:  ‘Fifteen years. I will croak in prison then, should have told the Feds nothing. I 
should have kept quiet and stay out of this plea-bargaining shit! I should have 
taken it to the fucking trial.’  
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There are several discursive objects generated by this account. For the reasons of economy, I 
would like to focus on only one of them, which was introduced by the attorney as ‘illegal 
weapons’ (marked → (1), the above excerpt). The item ‘weapons’ entered the interaction in 
the oral mode as it was enunciated by the attorney. Grammatically, it was given in the 
nominal form, as a substantive. This way of appearance is not accidental: according to 
Komter (2006), the nominal form is common if not preferential for the legal discourse 
because it reflects the nomilization of criminal charges in criminal codes and statutes. 
Coinciding with the act of enunciation is the act of pointing to the legal document that ‘kept’ 
the object. The referenced text was a copy of the Presentence Report compiled by the 
probation officer for all the parties (judge, prosecutor, and defense ensemble). The purpose of 
the document is to prepare the federal defendant, who chose to plead guilty, to the pre-
calculated sentence. In addition to other functions (profiling the defendant), the document is 
designed to present the charges as well as various circumstances that aggravate or mitigate 
these charges. A formula from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines is applied to the 
calculations to designate a certain level that would give the judge a range of sentencing 
options. The place in the report that ‘released’ the item ‘illegal weapons’ dealt with the 
aggravating circumstance which, as the attorney explained earlier, increased the sentencing 
brackets by two levels. We might say then that the object came into the Presentence Report 
and then into the attorney’s discourse linked to the legal rule. In turn, the use of a rule has to 
satisfy a particular pragmatic force (Conley and O’Barr 1990).  
 In the legal context this force is stated explicitly; it is inscribed in the very word that 
designates the initiative by the court against the citizen: ‘a public complaint’ (Drew and Holt 
1988). The complaint against Dane Savery in regard to his illegal activities was stipulated by 
the following rule: ‘Pursuant to USSG §2D1.1(b)(1), if a dangerous weapon (including a 
firearm) was possessed, increase by 2 levels. The defendant possessed and transported 
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firearms during drug transactions.’ In this statement we find a split identity that precedes the 
attorney’s ‘illegal weapons’—’a dangerous weapon’ and a ‘firearm.’ We might say then that 
it was the latter identity that was ‘fixed’ as a result of the talk-to-talk transformation. It was 
‘fixed’ in text grammatically as an object, syntactically as a subject-object, semantically as a 
‘projectile weapon,’ and pragmatically as an account in support of the legal rule (i.e., ‘The 
defendant possessed…’). The textualization of this identity engages the operation of 
connecting the ordinary (a person in possession of a weapon) to the legal (possession of a 
firearm during drug transaction, an illegal activity) realms. With this transformation, the gun 
indeed becomes ‘an illegal weapon.’ Let us look at the original transformative path as it took 
place in the police report: 
Incident Report: 213795z23  
 
‘after the truck pulled over, a man jumped out and started running…I called for a 
back-up and pursued the person on feet. When I caught up with him, I commanded 
him to drop on the ground and show me his hands. The person on the ground 
identified himself as Dane Savery […] When we searched the truck, we found small 
amounts of Cannabis and methamphedamine. In the trunk, I discovered two rifles, 22. 
Winchester and 35. Browning. The chambers of both weapons were empty. Also, in 
the trunk I found two unopened boxes with cartridges, one for each firearm […] As a 
result of my field investigation, I charged Savery with possession of illegal substance, 
read him his rights and arrested him’ […] 
This report does not only constitute the original document that ‘captured’ the item ‘weapons’ 
and ‘firearms’ for the first time, it establishes the pattern of transformation of the ordinary 
term ‘rifle’ through a concretization (minimization) of the kind of rifles into technical terms, 
‘weapons’ and ‘firearm.’ In their actions--searching the vehicle and confiscating the 
weapons—the police were mindful of ‘Rule 104, Article 1 of the US Criminal Code ‘Rules of 
Evidence.’ Importantly and in accordance with the rule, the mentions of the weapons at this 
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point are not thematized in terms of their legality (as they were not used by the defendant and 
were legal to possess due to their small calibre which excluded them from the list of licensed 
weapons), but are noted in the prospective sense, as a possibly illegal item. The arrest was 
committed on the basis of ‘possession of illegal substance,’ not ‘illegal weapons.’ In this 
regard, Martinez (2006) is helpful in showing how the interrelationship between the rules, the 
texts and the activities of collecting evidence creates a complicated environment that allows 
some oral discourse (e.g., witness testimony) to become a case-relevant object of law by way 
of fixing it in a specific documented form. 
             By returning to the replica of this form, the attorney ‘unfixes’ it, without removing it 
from the legal discourse altogether (as he could have done by starting a general discussion of 
different types of weapons and their usefulness in hunting different kinds of game; instead, he 
‘sets the fixed identity in motion’). Let us examine now how ‘the unfixing’ is made possible. 
First, the attorney reformulates the textualized object by giving it a somewhat altered form; he 
substitutes the ‘dangerous’ for ‘illegal.’ The point of institutional reformulation is to create a 
device ‘through which a practice is mobilized by participants in a given interaction’ (Drew 
2003: 296). In other words, the reformulation provides a summary of the previous discourse 
in terms of another discourse that pursues a specific purpose. In this case, the purpose of the 
summarized term ‘illegal weapons’ is to provide an account for the defendant’s accusation. 
The lexical choice of modifier ‘illegal’ connotes a degree of ambiguity: to simply claim that 
something is illegal is only to claim that something could be subjected to law. The 
pluralization of ‘weapons’ reinforces ambiguity by endowing the object with volume and 
consistency of a generic item.  
               It is to that ‘identity’ that Dane responds with his own formulation: ‘fucking BB 
Guns. A .22 and a .35’ (marked → (2), the above excerpt). With his response, he turns down 
the attorney’s use of the legal term for a much more potent colloquial expression. On a formal 
level, he also rejects both the identity offered by the attorney and the fixed textual identity. 
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However, we cannot say that Dane’s act of reformulation managed to remove the object under 
discussion from the legal space of signification. By his own admission, Dane read Jack’s 
letter of June 19, 2003, which contained the following formulation: ‘We have only 10 days 
from the date we received the Report (June 18), to file objections to this. Call me as soon as 
you can.’ In addition, the letter included a detailed explanation of the reasons given by the 
probation officer for several increases up to Sentencing Level 35. The one concerning the 
illegal weapons was described by the attorney as follows: ‘You also received a level 2 for the 
use of a gun in the matter.’ Thus, the documents received by Dane prior to the conference and 
apparently examined by him offered him a choice of the three co-determining terms: 
‘dangerous weapons’ and ‘firearms’ as stated in the Presentence Report and ‘gun’ as stated in 
the attorney’s letter. Dane deployed ‘fucking BB guns. A ‘.22’ and a ‘.35,’ however. By not 
repeating the term-in-text, but proffering his own term, unsurprisingly, Dane disaffiliates from 
the Probation Officer and somewhat affiliates with Jack, whose semi-formal formulation of 
‘guns’ gives Dane a ‘lead’ to his own expression. In it, Dane manages to downgrade the legal 
term ‘weapons’ to the mundane ‘guns,’ thus challenging the relevance of the term ‘weapons’ 
as a term contextualized in law. His further description of the guns in the context of their 
calibre and intended use (‘shooting prairie dogs’) formulates the challenge in the positive 
terms as an intention to ‘legitimize’ the identity of ‘guns’ on the grounds of ‘common sense.’ 
Collaborating in ‘close proximity’ helps Dane and his attorney make a selection of the ‘right’ 
kind of information for its subsequent reformulation in what appears to be ‘direct evidence’ 
(Sarangi 1998: 263). 
               The next reformulation comes immediately after and belongs to the attorney: ‘them 
rifles….not like a GUN gun…a bunch of good for nothing rifles’ (marked → (3), the above 
excerpt). The reformulation is given as a lateral repeat of the defendant’s downgrade; 
however, its form exhibits some difference. The phrasing of ‘good for nothing rifles’ presents 
specific guns as a general category of ‘rifles.’ Although ostensibly a ‘weapon,’ ‘rifle’ is a 
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category that does not usually include handguns, or automatic weapons. Rifles are used for 
hunting; so, they can be just rifles. Therefore, following the trajectory of the client’s 
reformulation, in his own reformulation, the attorney signals his acceptance of the defendant’s 
downgrade as the primary reason for the subsequent legal action: ‘I will file an objection.’  
With this act, the item ‘rifles’ is set to be transposed back into the properly legal realm as a 
legal arguable. Dane’s clarifying interjection at this point is important for the collaborative 
nature of the identity construction: ‘And they never found a handgun on me’ (marked → (4), 
the above excerpt). In this formulation, Dane clearly denies the existence of one type of illegal 
weapon, while admitting to the other identified by the attorney as ‘a bunch of good for 
nothing rifles.’ Note, in this connection, the purposefully ambiguous phrasing of Jack’s 
promise that follows: ‘Then, we are going to say that you showed good on these accusations 
and they need to ease off your back a little.’ The guns are no longer in discourse; instead, the 
attorney refers to the overreaching pragmatic act, ‘accusations.’ The phrasing is not just 
ambiguous but idiomatic (‘ease off your back a little’). In their analysis of topic transitions in 
the ordinary talk, Drew and Holt (1998) showed that the use of figures of speech functions as 
summaries and therefore transition points. Indeed, at the end of the above excerpt, after Jack’s 
summary, the topic shifts to other matters (drugs and witnesses). The promised act finds its 
written match in the attorney’s notes:  
 wants to argue ‘illegal weapons’ 
   also, the amounts 
  write letter to PA 
Thus, in a highly economical, which is also to say, definitive, and at the same time ambiguous 
manner, the attorney transforms the content of the client’s complaint by giving it a succinct 
formulation: ‘illegal weapons.’ It is worth noting that the attorney’s written formulation is 
identical to his initial oral formulation. Scheffer gives a detailed examination of the attorney’s 
notebook to show that case-making is essentially a process of selective binding of ‘fresh talk’ 
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to gathered facts’ (2006: 337). Below ‘illegal weapons,’ he puts down ‘the amounts’ referring 
to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines that specify the quantity of the discovered drugs in terms 
of the brackets or the number of years of imprisonment. This relationship should give us the 
idea as to the relational identity, or the identity of one object being defined through the 
identity of another. The pragmatic force fills the semantic content with a purpose: the 
construction of the upcoming argument, as in the attorney’s promise to Dane (‘we will say’). 
By his promise, Jack intends to create an arguable that would reveal the identity of the ‘illegal 
weapons’ via its relation to another item, ‘drugs.’  It is then not the discursive object but the 
relation of one item to another that comes to serve as the ‘arguable’ in the attorney’s 
correspondence. According to Coulter (1990), arguable is a sequentially topicalized item of 
argumentation. For constructing his particular arguable, the attorney simultaneously employs 
several identities for the same object: the identity ‘illegal weapons’ as a shell, and the repeat 
on the downdrage originally given by the defendant, ‘good for nothing rifles,’ as the 
implicature (Levinson 2000). The mode in which the attorney is going to carry out this 
transposition is writing, which meant another round of textualization. 
 It might be helpful at this juncture to make a provisional summary for our analysis. 
Thus far, we have seen how, in a stepwise fashion, the defense attorney and his client 
topicalize an item extracted from the legal record and reformulate it several times, while the 
attorney is compressing it into a handwritten text, his notes. We have also seen that the object 
of discourse acquired several interrelated identities that entered into a competition with each 
other for impact in fulfilling a certain pragmatic task: present a most proper figure. By 
‘proper’ I mean fitting to the purpose of the interaction (provide a response to the Presentence 
Report). From this perspective, discursive identity is pragmatic; it is a figure that, once placed 
within the legal discourse, functions as an ‘arguable.’ Therefore, the movement from an 
object identity to another object identity, from one item to another, designates the process of 
figuration which is an interactional and communicative accomplishment of a particular 
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pragmatic task. It is in this process then that I see an inherent dynamism of the discursive 
object in legal discourse. Importantly, no distance is covered by ‘reidentifications,’ only new 
figures and therefore new arguables are being made at the ‘figurative pivot’ (Holt and Drew 
2005: 35). The next excerpt shows the resources employed as to turning the previous arguable 
‘a bunch of good for nothing riles’ into the arguable ‘The Defendant herein has always owned 
firearms.’ It is not surprising then that we find this arguable in the attorney’s Objection to 
Presentence Report, Paragraph 22. 
3. From ‘Firearms’ to ‘Firearms’ 
 ‘Defendant objects to the 2 level increase for possession of a firearm.  Specifically, 
FSG§2D1.1(b)(1) provides that ‘If a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was 
possessed, increase by two levels.’ However, commentary note Number 3 provides 
that ‘The enhancement for weapon possession reflects the increased danger of 
violence when drug traffickers possess weapons.  The adjustment should be applied if 
the weapon was present, unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected 
with the offense.’ The Defendant herein has always owned firearms. He possessed 
firearms before he was involved in drug trafficking. He had not changed his manner of 
firearm possession simply because he was dealing drugs. As such, it is improbable that 
the weapon was connected with the offense.’  
 
In this excerpt, the attorney joins the argument instigated by the probation officer, who, in his 
Presentence Report, refers to rule FSG§2D1.1 (b) (1) that defines the preferred umbrella form 
for the discussed item, and, through this encompassing formal category, links it to the 
arguable, that is, a set of legal (formal) reasons, e.g., ‘If a dangerous weapon (including a 
firearm) was possessed, increase by two levels.’ A strong orientation to rules turns them into 
the preferred arguables for legal discourse (Halldorsdottir 2006). In this particular case, one 
might expect the argument to develop on the original grounds of the downgrade, meaning that 
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the emphasis is going to fall on the relevancy of a kind of gun and that the defendant’s 
formulation ‘BB guns’ will be expressed in the corresponding definition of a ‘not [so] 
dangerous weapon.’ Instead, the attorney constructs an exemption from the rule by offering a 
set of progressively ordered references to the defendant’s habitual behavior associated with 
‘firearms’ in general. The terms ‘firearm’ comes linked to the term ‘weapons,’ the item that 
the attorney marked for textualization. The modifier ‘illegal’ of the original phrase is omitted 
for the reasons of ambiguity: the attorney is creating a space for the route that would let him 
introduce the behavioral pattern of the defendant. Attributing and denying responsibility is 
inevitable in the context of accusing someone of a wrongdoing (Pomerantz 1978). Note in this 
connection the emphatic use of adverbs ‘always,’ ‘before,’ and ‘simply’ in the last three 
sentences of the excerpt. These uses indicate that under the attorney might be resorting to ‘an 
extreme case formulation’ deployed, for one, ‘to defend against or counter challenges to the 
legitimacy of complaints, accusations, justifications, and defenses’ (Pomerantz 1986: 219). 
Together, they meet on the same semantic platform of ‘consistency.’ The shift means new 
implications for the identity of the object under discussion. Whence positioned within the 
‘character’ argument, the formal use of the term ‘firearms’--coupled with the term ‘illegal 
weapon’--points not to a new but to the old and vulgar identity of a gun, which, although no 
longer harmless in itself, becomes harmless in the hands of the ‘consistent’ defendant, and 
therefore can not be considered as a dangerous weapon. 
 In this way, the object originally defined as ‘illegal weapons’ again discloses its 
duality; it is both definitive and ambiguous. Its definitiveness is maintained by two referential 
linkages: a) to the defendant as the self-admitted criminal and the possessor of the ‘guns,’ and 
b) to the legal rule that specifies the role of the guns as ‘illegal weapons.’  Although the item 
‘weapon’ is presented in the generic sense, as an arguable it provides the generic item with 
specificity by performing a reduction to instrumentality, the weapon’s ‘use.’ The connection 
of the ‘use of weapons’ to the specificity of the defendant’s behavior merges the definitive 
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and the ambiguous toward presenting the previous figure as yet another figure. This other 
figure has a different lexical form, and a different act is assigned to it. Although it is 
textualized in the same medium, writing, it is placed on a different trajectory of opposition. At 
the end of this trajectory, the multi-term ‘firearm-illegal weapon’ undergoes a pivotal 
transfiguration through the argument, changing the meaning of ‘illegal weapons’ first to 
‘useless guns’ and then to ‘possessed weapons.’ The co-presence of these terms within the 
same argument not only endows the transfigured object with definitive ambiguity; they make 
the argument itself appear as two-sided again, namely, introduced as the legal argument about 
the danger of possessing weapons for the criminal, in the course of its construction, the 
argument links itself to the discussion of the defendant’s character in terms of his probable 
actions. The mechanism of connecting is reminiscent of the one done in civil litigation, where 
a dispute undergoes transformation by splitting the initial claim into several claims by the 
contrary party (Felstiner et al. 1980-1981). In the Savery case, the duality is upheld in the 
response from the Probation Officer who presents the object under discussion as a cluster of 
lexical variants, using the informal ‘guns’ and formal ‘firearms’ intermittently. His use of the 
two identities in the Addendum to the Presentence Report, Paragraph 22, differs drastically 
from that of the Attorney’s Objection. 
4. Making Way for ‘Firearms’ with ‘Guns’ 
‘As noted in Paragraph 9 of the Presentence Report, the defendant traded guns for 
methamphetamine. Several of the individuals involved in drug transactions with the 
defendant reported they traded guns for drugs with him. In addition, others witnessed 
him possess a firearm, either on his person or in his vehicle, while trafficking drugs or 
using drugs. The defendant told Alice Iron Ax the reason he carried a firearm was to 
protect himself and in case law enforcement came around. She also reported on one of 
the trips to Sioux City for methamphetamine, he transported 12 guns in the back seat 
of his vehicle. There are several cases that support an enhancement when there is a 
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firearm present in connection with a drug transaction. The following cases support a 
two-level enhancement [further, ten cases are cited]. Therefore, the two-level 
enhancement should remain.’ 
From this passage it appears that the Probation Officer extends both items ‘guns’ and 
‘firearms’ as the two branches of the same semantic tree. The use of the two terms appears to 
be interchangeable: the Probation Officer refers to both terms several times in the same 
context of witnesses and testimonies. However, the appearance of interchangeability is 
deceptive, for the two close synonyms reference two different fields of presence. While, the 
term ‘guns’ comes from the testimonies of the ‘individuals involved in drug transactions with 
the defendant,’ the use of ‘firearm’ references the defense attorney’s objection; it thus pursues 
a legal argument. By connecting the term ‘guns’ with the term ‘firearm,’ the attorney connects 
the two fields, which allows him to present the original object of discourse as a two-sided 
identity, replicating the object’s structure from the Presentence Report.  In turn, the co-
presence of the two identities give witness testimonies, which come from the same field of 
presence as the defendant’s testimony,  as legal rather than common reasons. In those texts, 
the probation officer uses the term ‘guns,’ which, once positioned side by side with the term 
‘firearms,’ not only allows for the dual identity of the object to continue but, and more 
importantly, for its legalization across the evoked identities. In the wake of this change, the 
everyday, which generates the defense attorney’s argument, also becomes legalized. In a 
sense, the probation officer refigures the term ‘weapon’ in the opposite direction to the 
direction suggested in the defense attorney’s Objection. It might be worth at this point to 
explore the content of the referenced testimonies, for they connect the character of the 
defendant to the use of weapons and finally to the weapons themselves. 
Excerpts from Witness Testimonies:  
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(1) Salem (9/19/2001) reported that ‘Savery is a violent person and always possesses a 
firearm.  Avery has used firearms to intimidate people who are late with payments to 
Avery.  He gets his arms in exchange for meth.’   
(2) Garrison (9/19/2001) has observed ‘Dane Savery with two handguns and two rifles.  
Garrison has observed Savery discharging a Glock .45 and 9mm pistol in front of his 
wife.’  
(3) Belle Savery (12/12/2001) advised that ‘Dane always carries a gun on his person. She 
estimated that he has approximately 30 guns. Dane always carries a gun in the small of 
his back. He also told he that he would use it ‘without hesitation.’’  
(4) Amber Iron Ax (17/03/2002): ‘Savery would say he would want to see her dance and 
would shoot his Glock .40 caliber near her feet. She observed numerous guns and a 
pistol and a silver 350 magnum. She observed him trade guns in various locations.’ 
The power of these testimonies lies in their collective and thus accumulative impact (there are 
twenty three accepted testimonies in the Savery’s file). They formulate and reformulate the 
same object within a very limited space of signification. It is in this sense that their identity is 
collective; they also provide for the identification of the same object (‘illegal weapons’) 
through referencing a variety of actual brands of guns. Both handguns and rifles are 
mentioned. Their collective identity as an illegal weapon comes from two sources: all the 
references point to the relationship between the witnesses and the defendant. The second 
source is the identity of Savery himself at the time evoked in witness testimonies: from the 
testimonies, he clearly comes out as a drug dealer. Finally, as a drug dealer who handles 
weapons, according to the witnesses, Savery did not use them to ‘shoot prairie dogs’ but carry 
out intimidating actions.  They were ‘acting guns,’ and though their actions exceeded 
‘common use,’ they could only be illegal in the context of the defendant’s illegal activities, 
which constituted the densest part of the case.  By binding the defendant’s specific objection 
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under the general category ‘illegal weapons,’ the defense attorney opened it for referential 
dispersal. Directing the dispersal from the documented witness testimonies, in his turn, the 
Probation Officer imposed the identity of ‘illegal weapons’ onto specific weapons, extending 
the defendant’s original ‘BB. guns’ or ‘not so dangerous weapons’ into the category 
‘dangerous weapons.’  
With these acts, the probation officer and the defense attorney collaborate in 
integrating the defendant’s object into the previously established set and then defining the set 
in terms of the argument, now on the level of evidence. To put it differently, by his objection, 
the probation officer grounds the arguable identity of ‘not so dangerous guns’ in the proper 
(for the legal realm) ‘factual paradigm.’ At the same time as they assume a paradigmatic role 
in the discourse, the ‘BB guns’ gains sufficient ambiguity to be able to return to the 
beginning, their first mention following the item ‘illegal weapons.’ The act of objection that 
evoked ‘illegal weapons’ during the conference got countered by the act of rejection. By 
meeting each other, the two acts form an adjacency pair that return the item under discussion 
to the place of its origin. The return means the sustained identity for the object ‘illegal 
weapon,’ whose transformations along the path of completing the adjacency pair of ‘report-
objection’ failed to secure either one of them into a different identity.  The defense attorney’s 
correspondence to the defendant in the wake of the Probation Officer’s rejection summarizes 
this process. 
5. Identity Restitution 
Letter from Attorney to Dane Savery (July 24, 2003): 
Dear Dane: 
Find enclosed herewith the response to my Objections. As I told you, we are going to have a 
difficult time getting any of these objections sustained by the Court. The response by the 
probation office is active. Get back to me. 
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Sincerely, 
Jack Dorman 
The letter finalizes the construction of the identity ‘illegal weapons’ by making it dissipate 
behind the purpose for its ‘deployment,’ the defense attorney’s ‘Objections.’ The letter is a 
result of the encounter between several arguables, or rhetorical identities, generated by the 
two sides in their responding to each other; hence, the reminder to the client that it is the 
Probation Officer’s response that ‘remains active.’ As soon as the ‘Objections’ close, the 
identity of the fixed object withers away, as it were, ceasing its dynamism until its next 
resurfacing in a similarly relevant legal fact. The conditions for that resurfacing are provided 
by the letter’s ending where the attorney invites the defendant to respond. A full hermeneutic 
circle emerges here, a completed trajectory, which begins with the attorney soliciting a 
response from the client and ends, after a certain course of actions, with the possibility of yet 
another problematization, and therefore a new action for the sake of law.  
6. Concluding Remarks 
There are several conclusions that can be drawn from the above analysis. First, in response to 
the original question, it appears that to fix an object in text does not mean halting its 
dynamism; it only means providing it with a platform for various appearances. In the legal 
discourse of the analyzed data these appearances occur within a specific space of 
signification, i.e., a case, which serves as the referential grid that gathers discursive actions 
into a particular “whole.” In this respect, the change of its identity means that, rather than 
being displaced, upon its engagement in either medium, text, or talk, a discursive object 
becomes transformed toward satisfying a specific context-imposed purpose. If we accept that 
the legal context presupposes that this purpose involves an argument, then discursive 
transformations change the object as long as they create a new figure, a new arguable. In the 
legal discourse, arguments tend to proceed along a particular path which is punctuated by 
case-relevant figures that, once documented, create an impression “fixed facts.” In fact, these 
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facts are but pivots that mark the starting point of argumentation. Their engagement leads to 
the process of figuration, which, in turn, involves revolutions around the initial point of 
invocation. As a result of these transformations, the object of discourse comes to possess 
multiple identities; importantly, none of these identities enjoys the status of the original or 
true identity; none of them counts as facts on their own.  
 The analyzed excerpt from a real criminal case demonstrated how an object of 
discourse, i.e., the term “illegal weapons,” appeared as the original identity evoked as an 
account by the defense attorney and used for the construction of a legal objection to the 
Presentence Report, where this identity was previously “fixed.” The purpose of the objection 
was the dismissal of the problematic object (“illegal weapons”), its removal from the record, 
its virtual disappearance. Instead, the item “illegal weapons” remained owing to the argument 
carried out by the Probation Officer who succeeded in retaining the original legal identity, 
while fighting down the imposition of a different one. As a result, at the end of its “journey” 
within the case-defined space of signification, the object “illegal weapons” returned to the 
place of its formation in the figure of “dangerous weapons” only to be “fixed” there again 
until the next surfacing. In the course of the argument, the object underwent several 
transformations, from “weapons” to “guns,” from “guns” to “firearms” and then back to 
weapons, changing its facets, without, however, changing its pivot, the first identity brought 
into effect by an argument. From this perspective, the fact that the figurative identity belongs 
to the written field is less significant than its belonging to a space of signification in general 
and a certain argumentation field, in particular, for it is as an arguable that the term “illegal 
weapons” sustained itself in its course. 
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Notes 
1 Ambiguity itself can become a means of definiteness when it is applied strategically. For 
example, ‘In criminal cases, both the government and the defense tend to hear what they want 
to hear […] they create and interpret ambiguous utterances in the way that best serves their 
purposes” (Shuy 2001: 446).  
2 The fieldwork was occasioned by an international  project ‘Comparative Microsociology of 
the Criminal Defensework” located in Berlin, Germany under the auspices of Freie 
Universitaet Berlin. The project’s objective has been examination of court hearings as 
ritualized events with an emphasis on how their ritualization and/or configuration are being 
achieved via various practices and activities performed and assembled by the defence 
ensemble. Therefore, at the core of the project lie those methods, artefacts, and devices that 
punctuate the process of legal performance at all stages of its enactment in different legal 
settings.  
3 Indictment: 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A)(VIII)846, 843(b) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. 
4 The excerpt’s coding reflects time, place, theme, and duration of the recorded interaction. 
5 Slang term for ‘informant.”  
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